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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT. By NORVAL MORRIS.*

Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press. 1974. Pp. xiv, 144. $6.95.
Reviewed by ChristopherT. Bayley**
In the rapidly developing critique of America's prison system
and sentencing practices, The Future of Imprisonment by Norval
Morris has emerged as a seminal work. It is really two books. The
first part deals with the moral and practical efficacy of prison (or
"loss of liberty") and sets forth Morris' views on rehabilitation.
The second part considers two aspects of the narrow question of
imprisonment:
(1) How do we decide who should be imprisoned; and
(2) Based on our knowledge of the failure of past and present penal institutions, how should a prison for repetitively violent
criminals be modeled in terms of physical plant and program?
Implicit in Morris' concentration on the decision to imprison
and the prison system itself is an acknowledgement that loss of
liberty by institutionalization is indeed an appropriate criminal
sanction. It is in this recognition that Morris' book assumes major
contemporary importance. To be more precise, Morris does not
view imprisonment as a "last resort";' rather, he views it as a
perfectly legitimate and morally justifiable consequence of
proven criminal activity.
Morris' initial chapters, "Prison as Coerced Cure" 2 and
"Rehabilitating the 'Rehabilitative Ideal' "3 are an important
foundation for acceptance of the fundamental idea that prison,
and, indeed, punishment in general, belong in our criminal justice system. It is in the first portion of the book that Morris
makes his major contribution to the debate between those who
view the legitimate goal of imprisonment as rehabilitation and
those whose jurisprudential model for incarceration is punishment. Morris criticizes the current treatment-oriented approach
as defective in that "prison behavior is not a predictor of com* Norval Morris is the Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology and Director
of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago.
** A.B. Harvard University, 1960; LL.B. Harvard University, 1966. Mr. Bayley is
presently Prosecuting Attorney of King County, Washington.
1. P. 6.
2. Pp. 1-27.
3. Pp. 28-57.
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munity behavior." 4 In addition, he finds a "psychological fallacy"'' in the treatment approach. Cures of the psychoanalytic
variety must be voluntarily complied with to be effective.
Morris writes with such wit and lack of pretention that the
result is a most interesting and convincing argument for the
"punishment" model of imprisonment. Witness the introductory
language on his purpose:6
At all events, it may help to carry discussion beyond the
present polar dogmatisms of the punishers of crime, with their
mindless reliance on the prison, and the curers of criminals,
with their boundless confidence in the enforceability of the Sermon on the Mount.
It is not, I think, menopausal depression that leads me to
believe that the proper use of imprisonment as a penal sanction
is of central practical and theoretical importance to the future
of social organization generally. From such large pretensions, let
me turn to the subject of this book-the future of imprisonment.
Morris begins by setting the current debate over "treatment"
or "punishment" in its historical context. The development of
prisons, and the subsequent abolition or abatement of imprisonment are fascinating stories in and of themselves. After briefly
examining "the dangers of diversion," 7 i.e., that in its control
features diversion may be more coercive than imprisonment,
Morris begins to develop his fundamental theme. He firmly establishes the middle ground which allows both imprisonment and
rehabilitation, but under conditions far different from the working model existing in most states today.8 Morris believes that
rehabilitation is consistent with imprisonment but notes that the
two concepts are often confused:9
Rehabilitative programs in prisons have been characterized
more by false rhetoric than by solid achievement . . . . They
have been corrupted to punitive purposes. But it does not follow
that they should be discarded.
Thus, rehabilitation is not bad per se, but is bad when it
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

16.
17.
3.
9.
28.
13.
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becomes a means for the incarcerated person to end his imprisoned status sooner than would have been the case had he not gone
through "rehabilitation." My own view is that rehabilitation has
been perverted in the current system because it has become the
purpose of sentencing for many judges. The offender enters a
program not after making a fundamental personal decision to
change, but because it is a way to avoid punishment. We have
even seen cases where the convicted person actually invents a
"problem" which supposedly underlies his criminal conduct so
the judge will focus on treating that rather than punishing him.
Morris argues that:"0
"Rehabilitation," must cease to be a purpose of the prison sanction. This does not mean that the various developed treatment
programs within prisons need to be abandoned; quite the contrary, they need expansion.
While he rejects rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment, the
author recognizes the utility of having such programs available
to prisoners. Morris would substitute "facilitated change," i.e.,
treatment programs voluntarily chosen which have no relationship to the time to be served, for "coerced cure," which is the
''corruptive" linking of successfully completing a rehabilitation
program to the time to be served."
This is the first principle for Morris' new model of imprisonment, "the substitution of facilitated change for coerced cure. "I2
The second principle, which is the subject of the second chapter,
is "the substitution of graduatedtesting of fitness for freedom for
parole prediction of suitability for release.",'3 Here again, Morris
refreshingly analyzes current practices and describes convincingly the logical and practical defects in them. The present practice in most states which have adopted the "reform" of indeterminate sentencing is for each incarcerated person to have his release
date reviewed on a periodic, sometimes even annual, basis. The
parole board or its equivalent has the power to, and in practice
does, change the time of release depending on whether they believe the person to have been rehabilitated.' 4 In his subchapter
Pp. 14-15 (emphasis in original).
P. 27.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
14. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 31 (1972); MicH. CoMiP. LAWS ANN. §
769.8 (1968).
10.
11.
12.
13.
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entitled "Predicting and Paroling,' 5 the author describes various
predictive methods and concludes that they are all inadequate
and uncertain. He argues that "[tihe link between release on
parole and involvement in prison programs must be broken."'" He
claims that all the evidence indicates that there is no way to
predict from "in-prison" conduct how well a person will do "on
the outside." Morris then cites several studies for the proposition
that "predictions of avoidance of conviction after release are no
more likely to be accurateon the date of release than early in the
prison term. "7
Rather than engage in the game of prediction through annual
or periodic parole hearings, Morris' plan would set a definite release date at the commencement of incarceration, based on the
relevant statutes, considerations of the crime, and the offender's
criminal history. He would also implement techniques for the
graduated testing of fitness for release, but it is unclear exactly
how those "techniques of graduated testing"'" would differ from
the "present faulty and fraudulent parole predictions of such fitness." 9 Ideally, Morris would abolish parole (as the proposed
sentencing act in Illinois does),2" but he acknowledges that there
may be political reasons for preserving parole temporarily. Basically, he is concerned with the opposition which the threat of
abolition would arouse from those whose jobs are threatened. His
compromise would take the resources of the parole system and
apply them to the task of setting a release date at the commencement of the offender's term. It is interesting that California, the
birthplace of indeterminate sentencing, has recently through its
Adult Authority announced a radical change from regular review
of parole dates to an advance fixing of those dates, to be affected
only by "good time" calculations. 2' The good time deductions also
15. Pp. 31-34.
16. P. 35.
17. Id. (emphasis in original).
18. P. 36.
19. Id.
20. The Illinois legislative committee studying the revamping of the criminal justice
system has recently proposed a sentencing act which would impose flat sentences and
abolish parole. This bill will be introduced in the Fall 1975 term of the Illinois legislature.
The change has Governor Daniel Walker's strong support. News From the Office of the
Governor No. 180-75 (Feb. 18, 1975).
21. There is also a flat sentencing bill in the California legislature. Assemblyman
Sirody introduced A.B. 1440 on April 3, 1975. Senator Nejedly introduced a similar bill,
S.B. 42, which was heard on August 13, 1975 and taken under submission by the Criminal
Justice Commission of the California legislature.
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apply to the proposed Illinois statute.2 2 In the state of Washington, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles has recently adopted
a rule ending its practice of annually reviewing parole dates, and
itself is developing a matrix of terms of imprisonment to be applied at the commencement of sentence and based on the nature
of the crime and the criminal history of the offender."
In concluding his chapter on "Rehabilitating the 'Rehabilitative Ideal,'" Morris steps back from the correctional institution
to the courtroom and prosecutor's offices. He correctly perceives
that "[o]ur present sentencing practices are so arbitrary, discriminatory and unprincipled that it is impossible to build a rational and humane prison system upon them."24 In recognizing
these flaws in present-day sentencing, he takes a line with which
I happen to concur, and which has been advanced by such distinguished jurists as Marvin E. Frankel25 and Constance Baker Motley. 26 Further, Morris offers his own ideas on the minimum conditions of the fair sentence based on what the offender has done,
rather than his personal characteristics. The sentencing discussion includes a section on plea bargaining, for as Morris recognizes, the vast majority of those convicted and sentenced for serious offenses have pleaded guilty.
In joining the plea-bargaining debate, Morris attempts to
square this practice with his overall concern for fairness and certainty in punishment. He rightly condemns "overcharging," a
process by which a prosecutor may obtain a guilty plea to the
offense he should have charged the defendant with initially. This,
in effect, creates a false impression of pleading to a lesser offense.
Morris concurs with the ABA Standardsfor the Prosecution
Function that the judge should have a role in plea bargaining.
His plan for "principled plea bargaining ' 29 would in fact involve
five parties at interest in the pretrial dispositive process: judge,
prosecutor, defense counsel, accused, and victim. Regarding the
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, Board Rule 5.170 (1975).
24. P. 45 (emphasis in original).

25. See generally M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER

(1973).

26. Motley, Criminal Law: "Law and Order" and the Criminal Justice System, in
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE (1975).
27. P. 53. I agree that charging more than can be proved is an inappropriate use of
prosecutorial discretion, but I do not think that it is a serious problem in King County.

28. ABA

STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

§ 4.3, Commentary (Approved

Draft, 1971).
29. Pp. 51-57.
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latter, his description of a current inadequacy of the system is
right on target. Victims are indeed "used" by the system instead
of being the true customers of it. From my personal experience, I
would stop short of this elaborate five party plea-bargaining system, but only for practical reasons. I feel that fairness as well as
the victim's interest can be served by "principled plea bargaining" between the prosecutor and defense counsel, subject to the
approval of the judge, if standards are adopted and followed.'"
The victim's interest can be served by informing him or her of
what is transpiring and by encouraging involvement to the extent
desired in the trial and sentencing hearings. A victim program
was started in our office one year ago which consisted of sending
a letter to each victim asking for information on possible restitution which we could use at sentencing. We have now expanded
the program with the help of concerned citizens groups in high
crime areas. We send a victim information brochure describing
how a case makes its way through the system, and solicit the
personal appearance of the victim at sentencing.
The final paragraph in this vital section of Morris' book connects his comments on various parts of the system and summarizes his preconditions for creation of a model prison system:"
To try, as the young now advise, to get it all together: there
can be no rational future for imprisonment unless present plea
bargaining practices, which are the main dispositive technique
for sentencing criminals, are rendered principled and orderly,
and unless sentences imposed at trial by the judge and thereafter by the parole board are set free from the crippling link
between prison program and release date. If these liberations are
achieved, then applying principles earlier enunciated, prison
may play a rational and functional role in the criminal justice
system.
As a final point let me emphasize why this is an important
30. Under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the California District Attorneys' Association has recently published a massive volume of filing and
disposition standards. The results of this study are compiled in the UNIFORM CRrAIE CHAROING MANUAL (1974). The practice standards themselves may be found in a shorter volume
entitled CALIFORNIA UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS wherein § II(a)(4) provides that:
The prosecutor should not use the charging process to induce a guilty plea to a
lesser charge prior to trial; there should be a reasonable expectation of conviction on the designated charge.
Here in King County we are completing our fifth draft of standards to govern these
prosecutorial functions.
31. P. 57.
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book. There is a wide and dangerous gap today between those who
run our corrections systems and the general public. This is certainly true in our jurisdiction where the problems are benign
compared to those with even higher crime rates and serious systemic problems.
Citizens, who centuries ago gave up their right of personal
retribution to the state, expect that state to exact, if not a pound
of flesh, at least reasonable measures of accountability ("Just
desserts" as articulated by C. S. Lewis)3 2 and deterrence. The
state, or its "criminal justice system" is not doing this at present.
Unless the performance improves and is perceived as improving,
pressures for vigilante solutions will mount.33 Also, the selfenforcement ethic, which has made everything from our traffic
laws to our tax codes work, will be seriously undermined.
We need efforts to reach across this gap, appealing with
equal plausibility to those involved in the prison system and ordinary citizens. Morris does this: he is reasonable but unafraid to
identify the Emperor's nakedness. Although he is careful to keep
it a principled debate, this can and should be a book of greatest
practicalimpact. 4
32. C.S. Lewis, The HumanitarianTheory of Punishment, in

GOD IN THE DOCK:

ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS (W. Hooper ed. 1970).

33. TIME, June 30, 1975, at 13.
34. For other input in the debate, see Morris' excellent "Selected Readings and
References" list at page 123. Two significant books published since THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT are: James Q. Wilson, THINKING ABOUT CIME (Basic Books, 1975) and
Robert Martinson, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (Praeger, 1975).
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THE OTHER GOVERNMENT: THE UNSEEN POWER OF WASHINGTON
LAWYERS. By MARK J. GREEN.* New York: Grossman Publishers.

1975. Pp. xxi, 318. $12.50.

Reviewed by Eugene H. Nickerson**
This book is an entertaining and provocative study of Washington lawyers who make a handsome living representing rich and
powerful corporations before the federal establishment and the
courts. The tale has been told before by Joseph Goulden in The
Superlawyers,' but he ranged over a series of Washington legal
luminaries from Clark Clifford and Thomas Corcoran, the prototypes of the individual practitioner thought to have "influence,"
to the great Washington firms which operate in a less flamboyant
fashion. Here the focus is on Covington & Burling as the city's
preeminent firm and Lloyd Cutler of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
as a shining example of the Washington lawyer who has climbed
to the top as head of a large firm.
Mark J. Green has been associated with Ralph Nader's efforts to reform corporate America and has been a prolific author
in that vein. He writes in a fast-paced, effective style. Here his
theme is that these lawyers, "who are among the most powerful
people in the country today,"'2 spend most of their waking hours
assisting big business-often by means of cunning and unethical
tactics-to perpetrate acts which are damaging and frequently
downright dangerous to the public interest.
As the subtitle of the book indicates, Mr. Green believes that
the Washington lawyers have "power" and that it is "unseen."
This book, in the Nader tradition, is an attempt to throw light
on the shadows in which Washington lawyers work. 3The author
has no doubt of their influence over the way we live:
Thus, what the social Philadelphia lawyer was two generations
ago and the financial Wall Street lawyer one generation ago,
Washington lawyers are today-as the locus of public power
shifts from pedigree, to money, to politics. They are to all law* J.D. Harvard Law School 1970. Mr. Green is currently the Director of the Corporate
Accountability Research Group in Washington, D.C.
** A.B. Harvard University, 1941; LL.B. Columbia University, 1943. Mr. Nickerson

served as County Executive for Nassau County, New York from 1962-1970 and is currently
in the New York firm of Nickerson, Kramer, Lowenstein, Nessen, Kamin & Soll.
1. J. GoULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL WORLD OF THE GREAT
WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS (1971).

2. P. 4.
3. P. 4.
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yers and citizens what the heart is to the body: by dint of central
location and essential function, both are the reigning organs of
their respective body politic.
In particular, their power stems from the fact that their practice
involves administrative agencies which can dispense or limit
great wealth to the nation's giant corporations. These agencies
are more susceptible than the courts to ex parte persuasion and
subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, influence.
Mr. Green attributes the reluctance of these practitioners to
attract the attention of the media in large part to the deleterious
effect which public attention would have on their influence. As
legal sociologist Edwin Smigel once noted, they regard "their
organizations in much the same manner as clergymen think of the
church-as an institution that should not be studied."4
Despite their success, the Washington law firms are decidedly more Democratic than Republican and are primarily concerned with public policy issues rather than purely financial matters. Therefore, they attract more liberal lawyers, and "it is precisely this evolution that has led to the essential dilemma of
Washington practice: liberal lawyers toiling for illiberal clients on
great policy issues." 5 This, Mr. Green says, leads the Washington
firms to do a fair amount of pro bono publico work, "now considered legal chic." 6
After brief and vivid sketches of the history of Covington &
Burling and of the career of Lloyd Cutler, 7 Mr. Green surveys
seven areas in which he says Washington lawyers in general, and
Covington & Burling and Lloyd Cutler in particular, have helped
to thwart the public interest: antitrust, drugs, foods, tobacco,
automobiles, airplanes and trains, and the media.
The author then describes in some detail how these firms
defeated or delayed the public interest in each of these fields, and
he elaborates on and traces the application of ten techniques of
Washington law firms-techniques he denominates the Ten
Commandments of Washington Law. They are:'
4. P. 6.
5. P. 11.
6. P. 244.
Their motives vary from a sense of professional responsibility to the psychological and political need to legitimize what some consider 'pro malo' work, to an
understanding of good recruiting-or some combination of all three. P. 262.
7. "On the one hand he's a corporate devil and on the other hand he's a nineteenthirties' liberal." P. 45.
8. Pp. 12-15.
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I. Reputation - [Tihe impression of power is power ....
II. Intelligence - [Q]uite simply, brains.
III. Reconnaissance - In a place where information can be
power, Washington lawyers often act as legal radar.
IV. Interlocking Interests - [Sitting on the board of a corporate client or previously working for an agency.]
V. PreferentialAccess - [Ability to] get to see the influential
VI. Lobbying - Access gets you through the door; lobbying is
what you say when you sit down.
VII. Law-writing - Even better than lobbying sympathetic
legislators for a law is writing it for them.
VIII. Inundation - [T]he more briefs and motions the better
... .[because] a heavyweight can always beat a flyweight.
IX. Delay - [F]or those seeking to avoid regulation, no decision is often a favorable decision.
X.

Corruption -

.

. .

. High stakes, desperate wealthy

clients, and compromisable officials can combust into corruption, involving unethical lawyers as well.
It all makes a fascinating, if not unsuspected story, and in a
time of increased cynicism concerning lawyers stemming from the
Watergate scandal, this book serves to illuminate legal abuses
which perhaps have escaped the general public's eye. It will add
to the pressure for an answer to the question of what is to be done
to curb those abuses.
As I reached the end of the book, I found myself wishing that
Mr. Green would devote more of his considerable talent and obvious intelligence to seeking that answer. He devotes one last,
scanty chapter to benevolent yearnings for more ethical practices
among lawyers (and for less hypocrisy about the American Bar
Association's CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY), and he discusses in one page the encouragement that the governmental and
legal system lends to legal chicanery?
One of the reasons I find such meager treatment unsatisfactory is that I do not believe that lawyers, even Washington lawyers as Mr. Green defines them, are all that "powerful."" 0 This
country is still to a large degree corporate America, as Messrs.
Nader and Green know only too well. Lawyers are far from being
9. Pp. 285-86.
10. Jerry S. Cohen, in a review of the book in THE WASHINGTON MAGAZINE, June, 1975,
makes somewhat the same point.
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"the reigning organs"" of the country and are too often the eager
handmaidens of the corporate kings. Indeed, the facts which Mr.
Green has marshalled establish that they are handmaidens who
are all too complacent about the objectives of their clients and
would do well to assert a greater measure of independence.
Things have not changed much since 1934 when Mr. Justice
(later Chief Justice) Harlan F. Stone warned that the growth of
big business had "made the learned profession of an earlier day
the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals
and manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations."'" It may be true, as Mr. Green says, that "no ethical
obligation required Lloyd Cutler . . . to oppose, systematically,
nearly every automobile-safety improvement on behalf of Detroit."" The "power" rested with the automobile manufacturer
and not with its advocate. It is an indirect and dubious method
of assuring safe automobiles to deplore their maker's spokesman.
Power must be attacked at its sources and not through its symptoms.
This is not to suggest that the lowly social ethic of many
lawyers is to be applauded. Mr. Green is effective in pointing to
the contrast between the standards which lawyers set for themselves in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY and those
they in fact embrace. A lawyer is prohibited from involvement or
acquiescence in the "commission of an unlawful act, even if received in confidence . . . . He should, if unable to get the client
to cease the conduct, make such disclosures as may be necessary
to protect those against whom the conduct is threatening or working illegal harm."" Can the spirit of this be squared, asks Mr.
Green, with a lawyer's direction of "a delaying action that permitted the continued marketing of a drug known to be dangerous
5
by his client and presumably by himself'?'
It is not enough to recite, as Lloyd Cutler has done apparently in his own defense,' 6 that the adversary system, not the
lawyer, is charged with finding the truth. As Mr. Green points
out,'" the adversary process is more the exception than the rule
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

P. 4.
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HAv. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1934).
P. 273.
Pp. 270-71.
P. 273.
See Cutler, Book Review, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1746 (1970).

17. P. 274.
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in Washington. The agencies permit wholesale ex partevisits. In
Congress, there is obviously no formal adversary system. Lobbyists patrol Capitol Hill and agency corridors with unremitting
vigor. Would it not make sense to introduce the elements of an
open adversary process in the agencies and the Congress? And
does not the present post-Watergate atmosphere present an opportunity to do so?
Moreover, if it is unethical for a lawyer to unnecessarily delay
a proceeding or to inundate his opponent with paper, how much
more deplorable is it for the agency or the court to tolerate such
behavior? Our only remedy lies not with disciplining the lawyer,
desirable as that may be. It is also possible to insist that our
public agencies fulfill their responsibilities. Should not more efforts be directed to obtaining laws and regulations to that end?
And what measures, procedural or otherwise, can be taken to
minimize the tendency, on which all objective observers agree, of
government agencies to take the part of those whom they are
supposed to regulate and 18"play the role of the watchdog holding
the lantern for the thief.
These seem to me to be questions deserving consideration
perhaps prior to those asked about lawyers. But in the end, procedural nicety can only mitigate or delay undesirable substantive
public consequences. To prevent them, and, equally as important, to protect the long-range public interest, the focus must be
on those who in fact wield the greatest economic power in our
society. They are not lawyers. It was coal manufacturers, not
their legal advocates, who held and exercised the power to sustain
the veto of the strip mining bill. It is the automobile manufacturers, not their lawyers, who persist in making vehicles which pollute the air, and successfully thwart legislative attempts to bring
about manufacturing reform.
All this is not to justify or excuse the lawyer's complicity in
assaults upon the public weal. Perhaps this book will contribute
to the rebirth, which now seems to be occurring, of Justice Louis
Brandeis' belief that lawyers are in a special sense a public utility
with responsibilities beyond the interests of their clients."
18. Jerry S. Cohen, THE WASHINGTON MAGAZINE, June, 1975, at 158.
19. [A]ble lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected their obligation to use their
powers for the protection of the people. We hear much of the "corporation
lawyers," and far too little of the people's lawyer. The great opportunity of the
American bar is and will be to stand again. . . ready to protect the interests of
the people.
Brandeis, The Opportunity In The Law, 39 AM. L. Ray. 555, 559 (1905).
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